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LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP-STATUTORY EXPATRIATION
INTRODUCTION

There is no provision in the United States Constitution which expressly gives or denies Congress a right to deprive a person of, or
prescribe a method whereby a person may lose, his citizenship. Yet in

the Nationality Act of 19401 Congress provided for the involuntary
expatriation of an American citizen upon the intentional commission
of one or more of several specified acts. 2
In 1957 three cases involving this statute reached the Supreme
Court of the United States.3 The constitutionality of the section providing for loss of citizenship by voting in a foreign election was
upheld4 ; the one providing for loss of citizenship upon conviction of
desertion from the military forces in time of war was declared unconstitutional5 ; and there was no decision on the constitutionality of
the provision relating to loss of citizenship by reason of serving in a
foreign military force, the case being remanded for additional action. 6
The opinions revealed a wide divergence of views among the current
members of the Court on the issue of congressional power to provide
for loss of citizenship.
One view, expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice
Black, is that Congress absolutely lacks any power to deprive a person of his American citizenship. In Perez v. Brownell,7 the Chief
Justice stated:
1. Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1137, as amended, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503

(1952).

2. The acts enumerated in the statute are: (1) Obtaining naturalization in
a foreign state upon own application; (2) Making a formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state; (3) Entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a
foreign state without prior authorization from the Secretary of State and
Secretary of Defense; (4) Accepting employment under the government of a
foreign nation where he acquires or has the nationality of such government
or is required to declare allegiance to such government; (5) Voting in a
political election in a foreign state or to determine sovereignty over foreign
territory; (6) Making a formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic
official of the United States in a foreign state; (7) Making in the United
States a formal written renunciation of nationality when the United States is
in a state of war; (8) Deserting the military of the United States in time of
war if convicted thereof and being dismissed or dishonorably discharged as a
result; (9) Committing any act of treason if convicted, or, being convicted of
wilfully advocating the overthrow of the government by force and violence;
and (10) Departing from or remaining outside of the jurisdiction of the
United States during time of war for the purpose of avoiding military service.
3. Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958); Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44
(1958); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
4. 54 Stat. 1169 (1940), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (5) (1952); Perez v.
Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
5. 54 Stat. 1169 (1940), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (8) (1952); Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
6. 54 Stat. 1169 (1940), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(3) (1952); Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958).
7. 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
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This government was born of its citizens, it maintains itself in a continuing relationship with them, and, in my judgment, it is without power
to sever the relationship that gives rise to its existence. I cannot believe
that a government conceived in the spirit of ours was established with
power to take from the people their most basic right.8
Mr. Justice Black echoed a similar feeling in Trop v. Dulles9 and
Nishikawa v. Dulles,0 declaring in the latter:
In my view the notion that citizenship can be snatched away whenever
such deprivation bears some "rational nexus" to the implementation of
a power granted Congress by the Constitution is a dangerous and frightening proposition.'1

Mr. Justice Frankfurter exemplifies the opposite viewpoint. If
any reasonable relationship, "nexus," can be found between the legislation and an express or implied power of Congress, he would uphold it as constitutional. Thus in Perez v. Brownell, 2 Frankfurter,
speaking for the majority, sanctioned a loss of citizenship for voting
in a foreign election on the ground that it was within Congress's

power to regulate foreign affairs. On the strength of this power,
he declared: "It cannot be said, then, that Congress acted without
warrant when . .. it provided that anyone who votes in a foreign
election of significance politically in the life of another country shall
lose his American citizenship."'13 In Trop v. Dulles,14 Frankfurter
would have upheld loss of citizenship as a result of conviction for
desertion from the military forces in time of war. Dissenting from
the majority opinion which had declared the statute unconstitutional
as imposing a cruel and unusual punishment, he declared:
Possession by an American citizen of the rights and privileges that constitute citizenship imposes correlative obligations. .

.

. Can it be said

that there is no rational nexus between refusal to perform this ultimate
duty of American citizenship [i.e., service in the armed forces]

and

legislative withdrawal of that citizenship?15
The other justices lined up on both sides. Justices Burton, Clark
and Harlan followed Frankfurther's point of view in both cases while
Black, Douglas and Whittaker agreed with the Chief Justice. This
left Justice Brennan to, in effect, cast the deciding vote in both cases.
He voted to uphold the provision of the statute which was based on
the congressional power to regulate foreign affairs; 16 but could find
8.Id. at 64.
9.356 U.S.86 (1958).
10. 356 U. S. 129 (1958).
11. Id. at 139.
12. 356 U.S.44 (1958).
13. Id.at 62.
14. 356 U.S.86 (1958).
15. Id. at 121-22 (Dissent).
16. Mr. Justice Brennan voted with the majority in Perez v. Brownell and
did not write a separate opinion.
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no rational connection between congressional war powers and the
provision providing for loss of citizenship upon a conviction for de17
sertion from the armed forces.
The only point on which the Court appears to be in general agreement is that the commission of the proscribed act must be voluntary.
This does not mean that the citizen must voluntarily intend to lose
his citizenship. Rather, it means that the person must have performed
the act, such as voting in a foreign election, voluntarily. Loss of
citizenship follows the commission of the voluntary act even though
the person has no knowledge of the statute. It is a consequence which
Congress attaches to the voluntary commission of the act irrespective
of the individual's intention.18
A few decades ago the problem of loss of citizenship was not of
much practical significance to the average American. The problem
arose primarily in private litigation concerning the inheritance of
property as most states followed the common law rule that an alien
could not inherit property.' 9 Thus if the heir was an alien, the
property went either to other heirs or to the state. Statutes which
17. In Trop v. Dulles, Mr. Justice Brennan wrote a concurring opinion, this
time on the other side of the question.
18. There is also some divergence among the members of the Court on the

question of burden of proof. The majority require the Government to prove
the conduct was voluntary by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence.
In Nishikawa, the Court said: "Of course, the citizenship claimant is subject
to the rule dictated by common experience that one ordinarily acts voluntarily. Unless voluntariness is put in issue, the Government makes its case
simply by proving the objective expatriating act. But here petitioner showed
that he was conscripted in a totalitarian country to whose conscription law,
with its penal sanctions, he was subject. This adquately injected the issue of
voluntariness and required the Government to sustain its burden of proving
voluntary conduct by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence." 356 U.S.
at 136-37. While concurring in the result reached in this case that the Government had a burden of proof by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter felt that the Court was laying down too rigid a
formula for cases involving duress. "The Court should hestitate long before
imposing on the Government, by a generalized, uncritical formula, a burden
so heavy that the will of Congress becomes incapable of sensible, rational,
fair enforcement." 356 U.S. at 141. Justices Clark and Harlan felt that the
majority view was contrary to established rules of evidence and would
impose an impossible task on the Government. "Although the Court recognizes the general rule that consciously performed acts are presumed voluntary... it in fact alters this rule in all denationalization cases by placing the
burden of proving voluntariness on the Government, thus relieving citizenclaimants in such cases from the duty of proving that their presumably
voluntary acts were actually involuntary. One of the prime reasons for imposing the burden of proof on the party claiming involuntariness is that evidence
normally lies in his possession." 356 U.S. at 144-45. "The Court remands the
case presumably to give the Government the opportunity to show that Nishikawa's service with the Japanese Army was voluntary. Surely this is but an
empty gesture. The Government can hardly be expected to adduce proof as
to occurrences taking place in Japan more than 17 years ago which are now
shrouded in obscurity beyond serious hope of detection." 356 U.S. at 146-47.
19. See, e.g., Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99
(1830); Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242 (1830).
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allow aliens to inherit are now in general force; 20 thus this area
presents no significant problems at the present time.
With the development of the United States as a world power and
the advent of modern transportation systems the problem has become one of much greater importance to most Americans. Today it
arises primarily in disputes between the Government and a citizen.
Anyone can be a world traveler and innocently perform acts in
other nations which Congress has proscribed. The citizen may be
totally unaware of the consequence which Congress has attached to
the commission of the act. Yet, years later, when registering to vote,21
applying for a passport,2 2 or claiming some other right of a citizen,23
the individual may be informed that he is not a citizen because of
the commission of the proscribed act. Thus most situations where
the question arises today are based on the denial by a department or
agency of the government of a right or privilege claimed as a United
States national. The Nationality Act applies to situations arising
both within and without the geographical limits of the United States, 24
although there is a slight variance in the procedure involved depending on the location of the individual claiming such right.25 Section
1503 of the Nationality Act26 gives such a person a right to bring a
declaratory judgment action against the head of the department or
agency for a judgment declaring him to be a United States citizen.
What is the significance of loss of citizenship? Does it create a
stateless person? In the case of a native-born citizen, it would appear
to convert him into an alien in the land of his birth. In the case of
a naturalized citizen there is the possibility that he may be able to
readopt the citizenship of the country of his origin, depending on its
laws. But he may have given up citizenship of his prior country to
become an American citizen,2 7 in which case he would'have the same
status as a denaturalized native-born citizen. If the individual is a
dual national 2 8 presumably he could go to the country of his second
20. ATKINsoN, WnLLs § 24 (2d ed. 1953).
21. See Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
22. See Trop v. Dulles, 256 U.S. 86 (1958).
23. For an example of another right claimed as a citizen, see Shaughnessy
v. United States ex rel Mezei, 345 U. S. 206 (1953).
24. Under certain circumstances the act may be performed in the United
States. See, e.g., 54 Stat. 1169 (1940), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (7) (1952).
25. 66 Stat. 273, 8 U.S.C. § 1503 (1952).
26. 34 Stat. 601 (1906), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1503 (1952).
27. Actually, when a person is naturalized in the United States, he is required to give an oath of allegiance to the United States. The petition for
naturalization contains an averment that it is the applicant's intention to
renounce all prior allegiance to any other nation. Whether or not this works
as a renunciation of another citizenship, would of course, depend on the laws
of such other country.
28. The term dual national has several situations to which it may apply.
Basically, however, it means an individual who holds the nationality of two
countries at the same time. Some of the situations where it may arise are:
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nationality; or he may find acceptance in another country. It would
seem to be extremely doubtful that Congress could confer citizenship
of any other nation on a denaturalized citizen of the United States.
Most of the justices of the Supreme Court do not appear to be concerned with this aspect of expatriation. Mr. Chief Justice Warren,
however, expressed the opinion that it would create a stateless person.
In Perez v. Brownell, he stated: "Citizenship is man's basic right for
it is nothing less than the right to have rights. Remove this priceless
possession and there remains a stateless person, disgraced and degraded in the eyes of his countrymen." 29 In Trop v. Dulles, he said:
"There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive torture. There is instead the total destruction of the individual's status
In short, the expatriate has lost the right
in organized society ....
to have rights."'' 0
The case of Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 31 points out the situation in
which an expatriated person may find himself. In this case an alien
resided in this country for twenty-five years and then made a visit
abroad. Upon his return to the United States he was barred from
re-entry and no other country would accept him. He was summarily
detained on Ellis Island and on a writ of habeas corpus the Supreme
Court denied relief. 32 After four years of confinement the situation
33
was remedied by executive grace.
With this introductory background as a basis, the purpose of this
note is to discuss generally the statutes involved, constitutional issues
which are raised thereby and the present status of the law involving
loss of citizenship. There are some related areas, such as denaturalization by judicial revocation of citizenship obtained by fraud,34 denaturalization of dual nationals,3 and loss of civil rights by reason of
conviction of a felony,- which will not be discussed generally, but
may be referred to collaterally from time to time.
An individual born in the United States of alien parents is a national of the
United States and of the country of his parent's nationality; an individual
born of American parents while living in another country may be a dual
national if he acquires the nationality of such other country by reason of his
birth there; and in some instances a child born in the United States of naturalized citizens parents may also acquire the citizenship of his parent's former
nation.
29. 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958).
30. 356 U.S. 86, 101-02 (1958).
31. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
32. Ibid.
33. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1954, p. 10, col. 4.
34. 66 Stat. 269, 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (1952). See Maisenberg v. United States,
356 U.S. 670 (1958); Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660 (1958); Knauer v.
United States, 328 U.S. 654 (1946); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 605
(1944); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
35. 66 Stat. 269, 8 U.S.C. § 1482 (1952).
36. The loss of civil rights by reason of conviction of a felony is commonly
referred to as "civil death." Under strict common law rule an extinction of
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HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

In early history there was apparently no reason why an individual
could not withdraw from society, although it was probably not
economically feasible. 37 However with the rise of the feudal system
men became chained to the soil on which they were born. From this
system sprang the idea of allegiance and the oath of fealty, binding
the individual to a superior and to land. With the consequent breaking down of the feudal system many of its ideas were discarded, but
one which remained was the doctrine of perpetual allegiance. The
common law view developed that allegiance was immutable and no
person could give it up without permission of his sovereign.Despite this common law view there was an early feeling in the
United States that an individual could voluntarily expatriate himself.39 But it was not until 1868 that Congress formally announced
that it was the traditional policy of the United States that a person
has the natural and inherent right to divest himself of his allegiance
to the United States.4°
Although there is no constitutional provision relating to expatriation, the power of Congress to establish uniform rules of naturalization led to the early argument that there was an implied power to
provide for denaturalization. However Chief Justice Marshall, by
way of dicta, destroyed this argument when he stated: "The simple
power of the national Legislature, is to prescribe a uniform rule of
naturalization, and the exercise of this power exhausts it, so far as
respects the individual."41 Again by way of dicta the Supreme Court,
in 1898, stated: "The power of naturalization, vested in Congress by
the Constitution, is a power to confer citizenship, not a power to take
4
it away."32
During the 1860's Congress enacted the first legislation which proall civil rights followed civil death and a person civilly dead could perform
no legal function. The common law rule has been largely abrogated by
statute. It creates a problem similar to loss of citizenship, that is, a person
who may not have any rights but who would still be a citizen. See 16 Am. JU.

Death §§ 2-11 (1938).

37. "The right of expatriation is antecedent and superior to the law of
society. It is implied, likewise, in the nature and object of the social compact,
which was formed to shield the weakness, and to supply the wants of individuals-to protect the acquisitions of human industry, and to promote the
means of human happiness. Whenever these purposes fail, either the whole
society is dissolved, or the suffering individuals are permitted to withdraw
from it." Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 139 (1795).
38. "The general doctrine is that no person can by any act of their own,
without the consent of the government, put off their alleginace and become
aliens." Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 245 (1830).
39. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, June 26, 1806 in 8
WarriNGs oF THoMAs JEFFERSON 458 (Ford ed. 1897).
40. Act of July 27, 1868. R.S. § 1999.

41. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 827 (1824).
42. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 703 (1898).
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vided for automatic loss of citizenship upon the performance of
specified acts. 43 During the rest of the nineteenth century the Department of State made rulings on questions of forfeiture of citizenship
in its conduct of foreign affairs. 44 There was no express authority for
this action other than in some instances treaties 45 had been signed
with foreign nations concerning citizenship; and the Act of 186846
lent some support. Congress, however, did not act again until 1906
despite the pointing out by the executive department of the unsatisfactory condition of the law regarding denaturalization. 47 Then an act
was passed which provided that naturalization could be revoked where
it had been obtained by fraud or procured illegally.48 The following
year Congress enacted the Expatriation Act of 1907, 49 which was
actually the first general statute on the subject. It set out three
specific acts,50 the commission of which would result in expatriation.
There were only minor changes and amendments until Congress
passed the Nationality Act of 1940.51 After some subsequent modification, this entire statute was re-enacted as the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952,52 in which form it remains substantially unchanged at the present.
CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS

The primary constitutional issue raised in this area is the source
of congressional power to expatriate citizens. The early argument
that the power to regulate naturalization carried with it the implied
power to provide for denaturalization had been disapproved by the
Supreme Court.5 3 The earliest attack on a statute passed by Congress
concerning expatriation was made in Huber v. Reily.5 4 The statute
was sustained against the objections that it was (1) an ex-post facto
law; (2) an attempt by Congress to regulate the suffrage in the
43. Act of March 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 487, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (8)

(1952).

44. See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 49 (1958).
45. E.g., Treaty with North German Confederation, 15 Stat. 615 (1868);
Naturalization Treaty with Great Britain of 1870, 16 Stat. 775.
46. See note 40 supra.

47. See, e.g., 7 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 284, 291 (Richardson

ed. 1897).
48. 34 Stat. 596 (1906), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (1952).
49. Expatriation Act of 1907, 34 Stat. 1228, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1481
(1952).

50. The three acts set out in the statute were: (1) accepting naturalization
in a foreign country; (2) taking a formal oath of allegiance to a foreign
country; and (3) marriage of a United States woman citizen to a foreign
national.
51. Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1137, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1481
(1952).

52. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 8 U.S.C. §§

1101-1503 (1952).

53. See notes 41-42 supra, and accompanying text.
54. 53 Pa. 112 (1866).
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states; and (3) an infliction of pains and penalties without a trial
and conviction by due process of law. In a later case55 the Supreme
Court quoted Huber v. Reily with approval, though the constitutional
issue was not raised.
The power to regulate foreign affairs was used as a basis in the
1907 Act, and the Supreme Court upheld this as a valid exercise of
congressional power in 1915,56 stating:
As a government, the United States is invested with all the attributes of
sovereignty. As it has the character of nationality it has the powers of
nationality, especially those which concern its relations and intercourse
with other countries. 5 7
Subsequent legislation has been based on this power to regulate
foreign affairs.
In Perez the Supreme Court upheld the provision providing for loss
of citizenship by voting in a foreign election as a valid exercise of
the power to regulate foreign affairs.
The critical connection between this conduct and loss of citizenship is the
fact that it is the possession of American citizenship by a person committing the act that makes the act potentially embarrassing to the
American Government and pregnant with the possibility of embroiling
this country in disputes with other nations. The termination of citizenship terminates the problem. 58
The dissenters 9 in Perez felt that the statute encompassed conduct
that failed to show any connection with allegiance or transfer of
loyalty from the United States to any other nation.
In Trop v. Dulles,60 the majority of the Court held that Congress
had exceeded its power by inflicting a cruel and unusual punishment
on the individual by providing for loss of citizenship upon conviction
for desertion from the military service in time of war. Mr. Justice
Black in concurring felt that it was beyond congressional power to
place the power to denaturalize citizens in the hands of the military
authorities. Mr. Justice Brennan could find no rational connection
between the war power and the loss of citizenship. The dissenters6'
would not characterize denaturalization as a cruel and unusual punishment. They also felt that Congress was acting within the scope of
its war powers in enacting this legislation.
55. Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487 (1885).
56. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
57. Id. at 311.
58. 356 U.S. 44, 60 (1958).
59. The dissenters were Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas
and Whittaker.
60. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
61. In this case the dissenters were Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Burton and
Harlan.
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SPECIFIC ACTS WHICH REsULT IN Loss OF CITIZENSHIP

Obtainingnaturalizationin a foreign state62
This provision was first enacted in 1907, and, with some modification, remains in effect at the present time.6 3 What will constitute
naturalization in a foreign country? This will be determined by the
law of such foreign country subject to the limitation that the conduct
must be voluntary. Whether an act is voluntary must be determined
by an objective rather than a subjective standard.64 Thus a foreign
law which automatically bestows citizenship upon individuals would
not cause expatriation unless the individual indicated his willing
acceptance of such citizenship.6 5 Of course it should be realized that
inaction may be deemed to be a voluntary act.66 In Savorgnan v.
United States, 67 the plaintiff voluntarily complied with the requirements of Italian law by obtaining Italian citizenship in order to marry
an Italian citizen. The Supreme Court held that she lost her citizen-

ship.
I One particularly acute problem under the statute as originally
enacted was its effect on minor children, when their parents obtained
foreign naturalization, or were expatriated in any other manner.
Under common law a child has the nationality of his parents and the
State Department in effect followed this view by holding that it
would be inconsistent to allow a child to retain his American citizenship when the parent had lost his by expatriation. Accordingly the
act of the parent was deemed to have denaturalized the child also.
The ninth circuit followed this view in 1934.68 It was not until in 1939
62. "Loss of Nationality by Native-born or naturalized citizens; voluntary
action (a) From and after the effective date of this chapter a person who
is a national of the United States whether by birth or naturalization, shall
lose his nationality by(1) obtaining naturalization in a foreign state upon his own application,
upon an application filed in his behalf by a parent, guardian, or duly
authorized agent, or through the naturalization of a parent having legal
custody of such person: Provided, That nationality shall not be lost by
any person under this section as the result of the naturalization of a
parent or parents while such person is under the age of twenty-one years,
or as a result of a naturalization obtained on behalf of a person under
twenty-one years of age by a parent, guardian, or duly authorized agent,
unless such person shall fail to enter the United States to establish a

permanent residence prior to his twenty-fifth birthday: And provided
further, That a person who shall have lost nationality prior to January
1, 1948, through the naturalization in a foreign state of a parent or parents,
may, within one year from the effective date of this chapter, apply for a
visa and for admission to the United States as a nonquota immigrant
under the provisions of section 1101(a) (27) (E) of this title . . . ." 8
U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (1) (1952).
63. 66 Stat. 267, 8 U.S.C. 1481 (a) (1) (1952).
64. Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491 (1950).
65. Ibid.
66. See Sebastiano v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 278 (N.D. Ohio 1951).
67. 338 U. S.491 (1950).
68. United States v. Reid, 73 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1934).
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that the State Department altered it's view following the Supreme
Court decision in Perkins v. Elg, 9 stating that: "Expatriation... has
no application to the removal from this country of a native citizen
during minority. In such a case.., voluntary action.., is lacking." 70
This decision resulted in an amendment to the statute which compelled dual nationals to make an election of one nationality or the
7
other upon reaching their majority. '
One other problem should be noted here. The statute reads "obtaining naturalization in a foreign state." Does "in" mean physically
within the foreign state? Under the 1907 statute there was no requirement of subsequent removal from the United States. Apparently the
mere obtainment of foreign citizenship, no matter where the acts
occurred, was sufficient to cause loss of citizenship.7 2 .This issue was
raised in Savorgnan v. United States, 3 and the Supreme Court held
that it meant naturalization "into" the citizenship of a foreign state,
the site of the naturalization proceeding being immaterial. In 1940
the matter was settled by Congress when it enacted Section 403 of the
Nationality Act7 4 which provides in effect that expatriation by commission of some of the enumerated acts, when performed in the United
States or its possessions, would occur only if and when the national
subsequently took up residence outside the United States or its
possessions. Thus at the present time a person may perform an act
which under section 1481 provides for loss of citizenship; but, by
virtue of section 1483, the expatriation will be held in abeyance until
the individual takes up residence abroad. In this connection residence
does not mean domicile; 75 rather, "the test ...is whether, at any time
during that period, she did, in fact, have a 'principal dwelling place'
or 'place of general abode' abroad." 76
77
Taking an Oath or Declarationof Allegiance to a Foreign State
This provision was first included in the 1907 Statute and remains in
effect at the present time.78 It is analogous to the preceding section
in that the obtainment of foreign naturalization also frequently
involves taking an oath or affirmation of allegiance to the foreign
state. Signing of an instrument containing an oath of allegiance is
69. 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
70. Id. at 334.
71. 54 Stat. 1168-69 (1940).

72. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
73. 338 U.S. 491 (1950).

74.
75.
76.
77.

66 Stat. 269, 8 U.S.C. § 1483 (1952).
Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491 (1950).
Id. at 506.
"(a) ....
"(2) taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration
of allegiance to a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof ...
"

8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (2) (1952).
78. 66 Stat. 267, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (2) (1952).
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the taking of an oath within the statutory meaning.7 9 The oath must
be voluntary.80 For example, individuals entering the military service
of a foreign nation usually take an oath of allegiance to such nations.
If the individual was drafted against his will, the oath, as well as the
military service, is involuntary and he will not be deemed to have
expatriated himself; 81 but it is otherwise if he voluntarily enlists.82
Here again, in determining whether the act was voluntary, an obj ective test is used.83 The secret or undisclosed intent of the individual
has no legal effect on the issue of denaturalization. In Savorgnan the
citizen signed a writing which was in Italian. She could not read it
and it was not explained to her. She was held legally bound by this
act.
If by reason of extraordinary circumstances amounting to true
duress, an American national is forced into formalities of citizenship
of another country, there is no expatriation as there is when American
citizenship is forsaken as a matter of expediency for material con84
siderations.
Legal disability will prevent expatriation despite the oath of allegiance to a foreign nation. By way of example, a minor does not
expatriate himself by taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign
nation.85 Military service 86 and voting in a foreign election, 87 subsequent to the subject's eighteenth birthday are not confirmations of a
prior oath of allegiance. Similarly a citizen judicially declared insane
was held not to have lost his citizenship by subsequently taking an
oath of allegiance to Great Britain.88 The saving provisions of section
1483 apply to cases under this section of the statute also.
Entering, or Serving in, the Armed Forces of a Foreign State Without
PriorAuthorization89
This act was first proscribed in 1940, and remains so at the present
79. Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491 (1950).
80. Ibid.
81. See Gensheimer v. Dulles, 117 F. Supp. 836 (D.N.J. 1954); Scardino v.
Acheson, 113 F. Supp. 754 (D.N.J. 1953); Paracchini v. McGrath, 103 F. Supp.
184 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). But see Alata v. Dulles, 221 F.2d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
82. United States ex rel De Cicco v. Longo, 46 F. Supp. 170 (D. Conn. 1942);
McCampbell v. McCampbell, 13 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. Ky. 1936); Ex parte
Griffin, 237 Fed. 445 (N.D.N.Y. 1916).
83. Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491 (1950).
84. Perri v. Acheson, 105 F. Supp. 434 (D.N.J. 1952), rev'd on other grounds,
206 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1953).
85. Perri v. Dulles, 206 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1953); Di Girolamo v. Acheson,
101 F. Supp. 380 (D.D.C. 1951); Tomasicchio v. Acheson, 98 F. Supp. 166 (D.D.C.
1951).
86. Perri v. Dulles, 206 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1953).

87. Soccodato v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
88. McCampbell v. McCampbell, 13 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. Ky. 1936).
89. "(a) ....
"(3) entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state unless,
prior to such entry or service, such entry or service is specifically auth-
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time. Prior to 1940, mere service in a foreign military force would not
alone be sufficient to cause expatriation. However if such service also
involved taking a voluntary oath of allegiance to the foreign nation
expatriation would have resulted under the 1907 statute °
There is little authority on what constitutes "serving" and "armed
forces" as these terms are used in the statute. An interpreter working
for a Japanese corporation which was under the control of the military
was held not to be "serving" in the Japanese army.91 The Italian
Fascist militia (Mussolini's Black Shirts) was held not to be a part
of the Italian army.9 2
Here too, the acts must be voluntary. Conscription by the foreign
government is considered to establish prima facie that entry and
service were involuntary, 93 but it must be raised as a defense. 4 This
places the burden on the government to prove that the act was voluntary. 95 The standard of proof required is "clear, convincing and unequivocal" evidence.9 As a practical matter this will preclude the
Government from proving voluntariness in most of the cases due to
the passage of time and the fact that the activity usually takes place
in a foreign area.
The lower federal courts have split on the issue of whether or not
this provision of the statute is constitutional. 97 In the two cases which
have reached the Supreme Court, a majority have avoided the question, finding it unnecessary to consider this issue.98
There are two stated exceptions or situations to which the statute
is not applicable. If prior consent of the Secretary of State and the
orized in writing by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense;
attainment of his eighteenth birthday shall serve to expatriate such
person only if there exists an option to secure a release from such service
and such person fails to exercise such option at the attainment of his
eighteenth birthday...." 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (3) (1952).
90. United States ex rel. Rojak v. Marshall, 34 F.2d 219 (W.D. Pa. 1929).
91. Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952).
92. Di Girolamo v. Acheson, 101 F. Supp. 380 (D.D.C. 1951).
93. Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958). Prior to this case there had
been a split in the circuit courts. The Second and Third Circuits in Augello
v. Dulles, 220 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1955), Lehman v. Acheson, 206 F.2d 592 (3d
Provided, That the entry into such service by a person prior to the

Cir. 1953) and Perri v. Dulles, 206 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1953), held that proof of

conscription precluded a finding that foreign service was voluntary. On the
other hand, the District of Columbia Circuit in Alata v. Dulles, 221 F.2d 52
(D.C. Cir. 1955), and Acheson v. Maenza, 202 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1953), held
that involuntariness could not be inferred from the mere fact of conscription.
94. Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958).
95. Ibid.
96. Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958); Schneiderman v. United States,
320 U.S. 118 (1943).
97. Constitutional: Nishikawa v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1956), rev'd
on other grounds, 356 U.S. 129 (1958). Unconstitutional: Okimura v. Acheson,
99 F. Supp. 587 (D.C. Hawaii 1951), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
342 U.S. 899 (1952).

98. See cases cited in note 97 supra.
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Secretary of Defense is obtained, foreign military service will not
cause loss of citizenship. Also if one enters foreign military service
prior to his eighteenth birthday it will operate as an expatriation
only if there exists an option to secure a release upon attainment of
age eighteen and he fails to exercise such option. In addition the
saving provision of section 1483 also applies, though it is unlikely
that a person would serve in foreign military service while in the
United States. It should be noted that section 1483 (b) does not apply
to minors in foreign military service.
Accepting Official Employment Under a ForeignGovernment99
Another of the 1940 provisions still having force, this section contains alternate prerequisites to loss of citizenship, either of which
will result in expatriation. If a person has or acquires the nationality
of a foreign state, expatriation will result. Likewise, if a person
accepts, serves in, or performs the duties of any office, post or employment under the foreign government for which an oath or declaration
of allegiance is required, there will be an expatriation.
There is very little case law on this provision of the statute, but
generally the same rules set out under prior sections as to voluntariness, burden of proof, and evidence would apply. However, there are
two additional factors which enter these cases. Economic compulsion
is considered to be duress and thus employment accepted for economic
reasons is not a voluntary act;100 and a minor cannot expatriate himself under this section as he is legally unable to make a valid choice. 10 1
If a minor obtains employment and works beyond his eighteenth
birthday, section 1483 (b) gives him six months in which to assert his
United States citizenship or he will be deemed to have expatriated
himself under section 1481 (a) (4).
It must be shown that the employment is open only to nationals of
03
the foreign country.102 It was held in Kamada v. Dulles,1
that the
statute applied only where the performance of the employment required absolute allegiance to the employing government. Working
99. "(a) ....
"(4) (A) accepting, serving in, or performing the duties of any office,
post, or employment under the government of a foreign state or a political
subdivision thereof, if he has or acquires the nationality of such foreign
state; or (B) accepting, serving in, or performing the duties of any office,
post, or employment under the government of a foreign state or a political
subdivision thereof, for which office, post, or employment an oath, affirmation, or declaration of allegiance is required . . . ." 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (4)
(1952).
100. See Doreau v.Marshall, 170 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1948); Kamada v.Dulles,
145 F. Supp. 457 (N.D. Cal. 1956); Insogna v. Dulles, 116 F. Supp. 473 (D.D.C.
1953).
101. See Fletes-Mora v. Rogers, 160 F. Supp. 215 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
102. Ibid.
103. 145 F. Supp. 457 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
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in the Mexican post office' ° 4 and teaching in the Japanese public
school system 105 have been held not to result in loss of citizenship.
The saving provision of section 1483 (a) applies here also. Presumably, a person could accept an office, post or employment under a
foreign government and remain in the United States, thus providing
the basis for subsequent expatriation if he establishes a foreign
residence.
Voting in a ForeignPoliticalElection'°6
This provision, effective since 1940, was held constitutional in
Perez v. Brownell,10 7 as being within the scope of congressional power
to regulate foreign affairs.
What is a political election? It has been defined as "the act of
choosing by vote a person to ifil an office, which office pertains to the
conduct of government."' 08 The Supreme Court, in discussing congressional use of the term in the area of regulation of foreign affairs,
stated: "[C]lasses of elections-nonpolitical in the colloquial sense-as
to which participation by Americans could not possibly have any effect
on the relations of the United States with another country are excluded by any rational construction of the phrase."'1 9 If an election
is political its scope is immaterial; thus, municipal"O as well as
national elections are included within the ambit of proscribed activity.
The lower federal courts are not in agreement as to whether or not
an election held in American occupied territory following the end of
World War II is a political election."' There is also disagreement on
the question of whether or not occupied territory is a foreign state."2
The Supreme Court has not ruled on either of these points.
In the Savorgnan case, the Supreme Court by way of dictum stated
that the statute provided that voting in a foreign election operated
per se as an act of expatriation." 3 However the subsequent cases have
not been in accord; instead they have applied the general rule that
no conduct results in expatriation unless voluntary." 4 Few cases have
104. Fletes-Mora v. Rogers, 160 F. Supp. 215 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
105. Kamada v. Dulles, 145 F. Supp. 457 (N.D. Cal. 1956).

106. "(a) ....

"(5) voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in
an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory...."8U.S.C.§1481(a) (5) (1952).
107. 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
108. Kuwahara v. Acheson, 96 F. Supp. 38;41 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
109. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 59 (1958).
110. Bisceglia v. Acheson, 196 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
111. Political election: Acheson v. Wohlmuth, 196 F.2d 866 (D.C. Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 833 (1952); Acheson v. Kuniyuki, 189 F.2d 741 (9th Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 942 (1952). Contra, In re Reidner, 94 F. Supp.
289 (E.D. Wis. 1950); Brehm v. Acheson, 90 F. Supp. 662 (S.D. Tex. 1950).

112. See cases cited in note 111 supra.

113. Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491 n.17 (1950) (dicta).
114. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
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considered the problem where the voter was a dual national, but those
115 If a
which have, held there was no loss of American citizenship.
person under age eighteen votes in a foreign election, he will not be
deemed to have expatriated himself if he asserts his claim to American citizenship within six months after attaining age eighteen under
section 1483 (b). Also, voting in a foreign state after attaining majority is not considered an affirmation of an oath of allegiance taken
during minority.116
17

FormalRenunciation of Citizenship While Abroad
Since 1940 the statute has provided for loss of citizenship where a
citizen makes a formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic
or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state. This was
enacted for the benefit of dual nationals who were living in a foreign
country and had no other way to divest themselves of their American
citizenship. Section 1481 (a) (2) would not assist them as they were
already nationals of the foreign state, thus they could not renounce
their United States citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to
such foreign state. This does not apply to Americans under eighteen
years of age who take advantage of the saving provision of section
1483 (b). Of course section 1483 (a) would not apply here as the
statute specifically refers to an oath taken in a foreign state. The
oath of renunciation must, of course, be voluntary and duress would
vitiate applicability.
8
FormalRenunciationin the United States"
This provision was first enacted into statute in 1944 as a wartime
measure. It provides that during wartime a citizen will lose his
American citizenship by a renunciation in the United States. The
renunciation is subject to the approval of the attorney general for
security reasons. The only appreciable application of the statute
related to the Nisei problem during World War II. Several thousand
Japanese-Americans renounced their United States citizenship under
this provision. Following the end of the war many of them regretted
115. See Terada v. Dulles, 121 F. Supp. 6 (D.C. Hawaii 1954); Okimura v.

Acheson, 111 F. Supp. 303 (D.C. Hawaii 1953).

116. Soccodato v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
117. "(a) ....
"(6) making a formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic
or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state, in such form as
may be prescribed by the Secretary of State . . . " 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (6)

(1952).

118. "(a) ....

"(7) making in the United States a formal written renunciation of
nationality in such form as may be prescribed by, and before such officer
as may be designated by, the Attorney General, whenever the United
States shall be in a state of war and the Attorney General shall approve
such renunciation as not contrary to the interests of national defense ....
8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (7) (1952).
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making the renunciation. Habeas corpus proceedings were instituted
on the claim that they were being unlawfully held as aliens as the
oaths were obtained under duress. The ninth circuit held that the
renunciations were null, void and cancelled, being based on mental
fear, intimidation and coercion.1 1 9
A native-born minor cannot renounce his American citizenship2o
and parental renunciation will not affect the minor's citizenship
status. 121
Desertionfrom the Military Forces of the United Statesrm
This provision dates from 1865.m The original statute provided
for loss of rights of citizenship and the right to become a citizen. The
meaning of the phrase "rights of citizenship" was unsettled until the
1940 amendment made it clear that the loss was of citizenship itself.
A 1912 amendment limited application of the statute to acts of
desertion in time of war.124 A 1944 amendment added that a conviction of desertion was also a prerequisite; 2 5 but "provided further that
citizenship could be restored if the deserter was restored to active
duty during wartime with the consent of the military authorities.
There is no distinction between desertion overseas or in the United
States. In Huber v. Reily,
the supreme court of Pennsylvania
upheld the constitutionality of the statute; and in Kurtz v. Moffitt,12 7
the United States Supreme Court quoted Huber v. Reily with approval, though the constitutional issue was not raised.
The constitutionality of the statute was not directly passed on by
the Supreme Court until 1958, and in Trop v. Dulles, 128 it was held
unconstitutional. One Trop was convicted of desertion and given a
dishonorable discharge during World War II. In 1952 he was denied
119. Acheson v. Murakami, 176 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1949).
120. McGrath v. Abo, 186 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
832 (1951).
121. See Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
122. "(a) ....
"(8) deserting the military, air, or naval forces of the United States in
time of war, if and when he is convicted thereof by court martial and as
the result of such conviction is dismissed or dishonorably discharged from
the service of such military, air, or naval forces; Provided, That, notwithstanding loss of nationality or citizenship under the terms of this
chapter or previous laws by reason of desertion committed in time of
war, restoration to active duty with such military, air, or naval forces
in time of war or the reenlistment or induction of such a person in time
of war with permission of competent military, air, or naval authority
shall be deemed to have the immediate effect of restoring such nationality
or citizenship heretofore or hereafter so lost ...." 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (8)
(1952).

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Act of March 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 487.
37 Stat. 356 (1912).
58 Stat. 4 (1944), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (8) (1952).
53 Pa. 112 (1866). See not 54 supra, and accompanying text.
Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487 (1885).

128. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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a passport on the ground that he had lost his citizenship by reason of
the conviction. In 1955 he sought a declaratory judgment that he was
a United States citizen. The district court granted a Government
130
12 9
and the second circuit affirmed
motion for summary judgment
On a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court
speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Warren characterized the statute
as penal and held it unconstitutional as inflicting a "cruel and unusual" punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. 131 The Court
could find no rational connection between desertion and allegiance to
a foreign state, and thus would not sustain the statute as being within
the congressional power to regulate foreign affairs. The concurring
opinions felt that forfeiture of citizenship should not be within the
control of the military authorities and also that it was beyond the
scope of the war powers of Congress. The dissenters 32 contended that
the statute was a proper exercise of the war power and also that even
if it was a penal statute, it could not be considered as inflicting a
"cruel and unusual" punishment. Thus, at the present time this provision of the statute is invalid.
Committing an Act of Treason or Advocating the Overthrow of the
33
Government by Force or Violence
This provision applied only to treason at the time of enactment in
1940. But in 1954 it was amended 134 to provide for forfeiture of citizenship of persons convicted of advocating the overthrow of the government by force and violence. Cases of treason are relatively few and
the leading one is Kawakita v. United States, 135 decided in 1952.
Kawakita was a native-born citizen of the United States and a national
of Japan. While visiting Japan as a student, war broke out and he
became an interpreter for a Japanese industrial concern. Upon his
return to the United States he was recognized by a former prisoner of
war, and indicted for treason. The overt acts related to his treatment
of prisoners of war while working in Japan. The defense was based
on two grounds. First, he had expatriated himself by reason of his
129. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 88 (1957).
130. Trop v. Dulles, 239 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1956).
131. U. S. CONST. amend. VIII.
132. Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Burton and Harlan.
133. "(a) ....

"(9) committing any act of treason against, or attempting by force to
overthrow, or bearing arms against, the United States, violating or conspiring to violate any of the provisions of section 2383 of Title 18, or
wilfully performing any act in violations of section 2385 of Title 18, or
violating section 2384 of Title 18 by engaging in a conspiracy to overthrow,

put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or
to levy war against them, if and when he is convicted thereof by a court
martial or by a court of competent jurisdiction. ..
(Supp. II 1954).

134. 68 Stat. 1146 (1954).
135. 343 U.S. 717 (1952).

."

8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (9)
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abtivities in Japan, and second,*a dual national can only be guilty of
treason to the country wherein he resides. The Supreme Court rejected both contentions and affirmed a death sentence.13 Recognizing
that a dual national owes duties to the country of his residence, the
Court said this did not mean that he did not also owe allegiance to
the United States. As he had breached that allegiance, he was guilty
of treason even though he also owed allegiance to Japan.
The decision, in effect, places a dual national in the position of
making an election where interests conflict or else relying on the
defense of coercion or compulsion if subsequently charged with
treason. There was no issue of the constitutionality of the statute
raised in the case.
The added provision concerning advocating overthrow of the government by force or violence of this statute could make this section
become quite important. There has been no litigation on it to date.
It should be noted that under a literal reading, sections 2381137 and
2385138 do not specifically provide for loss of citizenship, but merely
loss of civil rights. However, Congress has apparently made no such
39
distinction.
This section states no age limitation. This raises the question of
whether age is irrelevant to the commission of these crimes. Another
problem implicit under all the provisions of the statute is presented,
i.e., would forfeiture result in creating the status of a stateless person
in the case of a native-born or naturalized citizen? Congress could
hardly impose some other nationality on the individual. Would a
presidential pardon reinstate nationality? i 4°
DepartingFrom or Remaining Outside of the United States in Time of
War' 4'
This provision was first enacted in 1912 as a part of the statute providing for loss of citizenship by reason of desertion from the military
136. President Eisenhower later commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment and a $10,000.00 fine. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1953, p. 56, col. 5.
137. 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1952).
138. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1952).

139. See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 73 (1958) (dissent).

140. The idea usually expressed is that citizenship can be restored only
through normal naturalization proceedings. See, e.g., Petition of Sproule, 19
F. Supp. 995 (S.D. Cal. 1937); In re Chamorra, 298 Fed. 669 (N.D. Cal. 1924).
141. "(a) ....

"(10) departing from or remaining outside of the jurisdiction of the
United States in time of war or during a period declared by the President
to be a period of national emergency for the purpose of evading or avoiding
training and service in the military, air, or naval forces of the United

States. For the purposes of this paragraph failure to comply with any

provision of any compulsory service laws of the United States shall raise
the presumption that the departure from or absence from the United
States was for the purpose of evading or avoiding training and service in
the military, air, or naval forces of the United States." 8 U.S.C. §
1481 (a) (10) (1952).
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forces. It was repealed in 1940,142 but then re-enacted into statute in
1944143 and remains in force at the present time.
It should be noted that it applies both to those departing from or
remaining outside of the jurisdiction of the United States during time
of war or national emergency for the purpose of avoiding military
service. There is no age limitation in the statute itself and the prevailing view seems to be that Congress intended it to apply to anyone,
including minors eligible for service in the military forces.
A departure prior to the effective date of the statute (September
27, 1944) would not be punishable. However remaining beyond this
date would be a separate proscribed offense. 144 As under other provisions of the statute, the act must be voluntary in order to result in
expatriation.
The provision has been upheld as constitutional in a circuit court
case, 145 but so far the Supreme Court has not ruled on it. The point
was raised in Perez v. Brownell,146 but left open.
Other Acts
The above enumerated acts are those which are set out specifically
in section 1481 (a) of the current statute. A brief mention should be
made of some other situations where the general problem is or has
been involved. A provision of the 1907 statute,147 no longer in force,
provided that an American woman lost her citizenship by reason of
her marriage to an alien. In 1915 the Supreme Court sustained the
validity of this provision in Mackenzie v. Hare.148 There, the wife was
held to have lost her citizenship even though she continued to reside
in the United States. The Court based its decision on two groundsthe voluntary act of the citizen and the ancient principle of unity of
husband and wife. In 1922, Congress passed the so-called "Cable
Act"'149 which provided for independent citizenship of American
women, thus altering the rule laid down in Mackenzie. The actual
effect of the 1907 statute had been held to mean that a woman's citizenship was merely in abeyance during the period of the marriage.
The effect of the later act of Congress has been that marriage to an
alien alone does not expatriate an American woman, but of course,
marriage coupled with another prohibited act such as giving an oath
of allegiance to a foreign state would result in expatriation. 150
142. 37 Stat. 356 (1912).

143. 58 Stat. 746 (1944), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (10) (1952).
144. Vidales v. Brownell, 217 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1954).
145. Perez v. Brownell, 235 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1956).
146. 356 U.S. 44 (1958).

147. 34 Stat. 1228 (1907).
148. 239 U.S. 299 (1915).

149. 42 Stat. 1021 (1922). The last remnants of the effect of marriage on
loss of citizenship were eliminated in 1931. 46 Stat. 1511 (1931).
150. Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491 (1950).
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There are additional statutes which relate specifically to loss of
nationality by dual nationals' 51 and naturalized citizens 5 2 These deal
with residences in a foreign state. In the case of a dual national, it
provides for loss of citizenship after a specified period of residency in
the state of his second nationality. As to naturalized citizens, the
statute also deals with residence in the state of which he was formerly
a citizen prior to attaining citizenship in the United States.
CONCLUSION

It is common knowledge that naturalization in the United States
has become increasingly more difficult during the past few decades.
It is not generally realized, 'however, that at the same time it has
become increasingly easier for one to lose his citizenship. Is there a
logical connection between these two developments? The reasons
generally advanced for the change in attitude towards immigration
are many; the closing of the frontier and the attitude of American
labor toward cheap immigration labor are usually given as the most
important. The same reasons would have no bearing on loss of citizenship; therefore the two trends are probably not correlative. Perhaps however, the basic idea is that American citizenship is so highly
valued that only the select can attain it and to keep the standards
high a penalty of loss should be imposed on those who disregard the
limits set by Congress.
Basically there are two trends of thought on the loss of citizenship.153 One is that citizenship is a right which cannot be taken away
by congressional fiat. The advocates of this position proclaim that
United States citizenship is a constitutional birthright under the fourteenth amendment. Citizenship is regarded as a basic right, because
it is nothing less than the "right to have rights." Taking away citizenship creates a stateless person. Government derives its powers from
the consent of the governed and is without power to sever the relationship that gives rise to its existence. If Congress can determine
that one act results in loss of citizenship, what is to prevent it from
saying that any act would result in expatriation? Once a citizen,
always a citizen, for better or for worse. If the Congressional purpose
is to deter persons from commission of the proscribed acts, it does not
seem to have accomplished the desired result. 5 4 The adherents of this
approach would allow a person to voluntary relinquish his citizenship,
151. 66 Stat. 269, 8 U.S.C. § 1482 (1952); 66 Stat. 272, 8 U.S.C. § 1487 (1952).
152. 66 Stat. 269, 8 U.S.C. § 1484 (1952).
153. See notes 7-17 supra, and accompanying text.
154. For example, despite the provision for loss of citizenship on conviction
of desertion approximately 21,000 soldier were convicted of desertion during
World War II. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 112, and n.8 (1958).-
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but insist no one else can take it away from him. They can be classi-

fied as alarmists.
The other theory is that Congress can provide for the loss of American citizenship despite the lack of an express power in the Constitution to do so. The basis of the power seems to be the fact that the
United States government is "invested with all the attributes of
sovereignty." 155 Consequently it has the inherent power to regulate
foreign affairs, 5 6 and can thus provide for loss of citizenship as a consequence of the commission of an act that is "potentially embarrassing
to the American Government and pregnant with the possibility of
embroiling this country in disputes with other nations."'157 The act
must, of course, be voluntary but almost any act can be characterized
as voluntary without too much difficulty. The adherents of this view
are strangely silent on how some acts which Congress has proscribed,
such as desertion from the military service in the United States, can
have any effect on foreign affairs. It is also claimed to be within
congressional power as it works as a deterent to others. There are
some who maintain that Congress derives its power in this area
through the war powers, but so far the Supreme Court has not approved this reasoning.
Of the ten acts which Congress has proscribed, the Supreme Court
has only had occasion to consider four. As has been noted, one was
held constitutional, 158 one unconstitutional, 159 one was specifically left
open, 160 and the Court has avoided ruling on the fourth,'161 although
lower courts have held it unconstitutional. 162 There is only a remote
possibility that some of the other sections will ever be ruled on; but
others may come up for a ruling in the near future, particularly if the
Government seeks to enforce them.
There are both statutory and judicial safeguards for the citizen.
Section 1483 sets out some statutory restrictions, and the courts have
placed a heavy burden on the Government by requiring it to prove
its case by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence. Further, the
act must be a voluntary one performed by the citizen himself, and
duress will be a good defense. The citizen must, however, inject involuntariness into the case, or the government will prevail merely by
proving the commission of the proscribed acts. In many cases the
courts have created a practically insurmountable barrier for the
155. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915).
156. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
157. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 60 (1958).
158. 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (1). Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
159. 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (8). Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
160. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (10). Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
161. 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (3). Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958);
Acheson v. Okimura, 342 U.S. 899 (1952) (per curiam).
162. See note 97 supra.
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Government due to passage of time and the fact that the acts complained of occurred in a foreign nation.163
One other point should be noted. There is a possibility that a
citizen may perform one of the proscribed acts under section 1481,
but have expatriation held in abeyance due to the saving provisions
of section 1483. A person may have committed one of the acts and
years later, having completely forgotten it, take up residence abroad.
Section 1483 would then come into operation and the individual would
be deemed to have expatriated himself as there is no time limit imposed under this section. In order to avoid possible hardship in this
area, it would seem plausible that Congress could pass legislation
requiring officials of the State Department to forewarn citizens upon
their departure from the United States. The official could make
inquiry of the citizen as to the possible commission of any of the
proscribed acts and if the individual admits having performed any,
the official would then be required to warn him of the possible consequences if he departs from the United States. Actually, Congress
could make it a requirement whether or not the individual admits
having committed any of the proscribed acts. Such a provision could
conceivably prevent future incidents such as outlined in Shaughnessy
v. Mezei.164
Whatever the merits may be of either side of this issue, the fact
remains that Congress has enacted this legislation and the Supreme
Court has held at least a part of it constitutional. In view of the
present constituency of the Court, it could reasonably be assumed
that any further decisions, at least in the near future, will be by
closely divided votes. None of the four on either side of the issue
appear to be willing to concede anything to the other point of view.
Thus the outcome of a case could conceivably turn on the vote of a
single justice.
Even though Congressional power to provide for involuntary expatriation was upheld in Perez, the other decisions weaken and reduce
the effectiveness of the statute. In view of the burden of proof which
the Court has placed on the Government, duress or involuntariness
will undoubtedly be a prevailing factor in many future cases. This
will, in effect, preclude application of the statute in many instances;
however, this is probably the price that should be paid for the protection of the individual citizen in the doubtful cases.
DAVID E. NFLSON, JR.
163. See, e.g., Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958). In this case the acts
complained of took place some seventeen years prior to the action in a then
hostile foreign nation.
164. 345 U.S. 206 (1953). See note 31 supra,and accompanying text.

